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Abstract
In this paper, I show how the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions and 
method converge on their treatment of the historical subject. Thinkers from both 
traditions converge on the following thesis: that subjectivity is shaped by a histori-
cal worldview. Each tradition provides independent grounds and methodological 
approaches which provide accounts of how these worldviews are shaped, and thus 
how essentially historical subjective experience is molded. In the second part of 
this paper I argue that both traditions, although offering helpful ways of under-
standing the way history shapes subjectivity, go too far in their epistemic claims for 
the superiority of subjective over positivist or academic history. They propose that 
the historicity of subjective experience is unexpressed and therefore inexpressible 
in positivist or academic history. I propose that although the phenomenological-
hermeneutic approach to historical subjectivity is both fruitful and valuable for 
understanding both history and human nature, it cannot and ought not replace 
academic or what I will call ‘critical’ history. By showing the importance of his-
toricity, and the force of historical consciousness on our actions, philosophers of 
history in these traditions expose the epistemic and perhaps even ethical require-
ment to engage in a rigorous critical history, one which recognizes the importance 
of historical consciousness. Such critical history is necessary to move beyond the 
subjective horizon of history as experienced to understand how events shaped this 
historical horizon.
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The historian observes, even though his object is not there.1
In the quotation above, Paul Ricoeur highlights the seeming paradox of 
historical investigation. We claim to investigate history objectively, scien-
tifically, and empirically – but the past, the object itself, by necessity, no 
longer exists. In this paper, I will investigate a related but slightly different 
question. Rather than, ‘what or where is the object of history?’, I will ask, 
‘what is the subject of history?’ I mean this in two senses: what is the impor-
tance of the human subject in history, and what is the subject and aim of 
the science of history. In order to answer these questions I will engage two 
philosophical traditions, hermeneutics and phenomenology, both of which 
shift the question of the ‘object’ of history to the ‘subject’. 
Phenomenology and hermeneutics come together in understanding the 
world as interpreted by and through the subject. The aim of phenomenol-
ogy, as articulated by Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and David Carr, is to reinsert 
the subject as the center and source of objective knowledge. The aim of 
hermeneutics, specifically that of Dilthey, is to center knowledge and inter-
pretation on the self-reflective subject who is the center of a meaningful 
historical nexus. Both traditions place the subject at the center of inquiry, 
and both agree on the importance of lived experience for understanding 
history. We will see that for an understanding of history, that is precisely 
where the subject belongs. In this paper I will work out this intersection 
between phenomenology and hermeneutics; I will show where they con-
verge in their attempt to include the subjective and the subject in history, 
and their consequent calls for a new method and understanding of histori-
cal inquiry. 
First, I will plot the development of the role of history in phenomeno-
logical theory, proposing that in the later work of Husserl, in Merleau-
Ponty, Heidegger, and finally and most explicitly the work of David Carr, 
phenomenologists came to understand subjective experience as essentially 
historical. Carr, in his work Time, Narrative and History, develops this phe-
nomenological historicism most fully. He uses Husserl’s notion of time to 
argue that we are essentially historical, and that our conceptions of the 
world and ourselves are constituted by our historicity. Without under-
standing the historicity of our experience, he argues, we can neither fully 
1) Paul Ricoeur. History and Truth. C.A. Kelbley (trans.). (Evanston: Northwestern Univer-
sity Press, 1991), 23.
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understand the world, nor properly understand ourselves. I will then show 
how Carr’s phenomenological method converges with the hermeneutic 
approach of Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey, famous for his conception of weltan-
schauung, and the notion that subjectivity is shaped by a historical world-
view, offers a deep and extended account of how these worldviews are 
shaped, and thus how this essentially historical subjective experience is 
molded. 
Although this phenomenological-hermeneutic approach to historical 
subjectivity is both fruitful and valuable for understanding both history 
and human nature, both Carr and Dilthey make a further, and I will argue, 
unwarranted epistemic claim; they propose that the historicity of subjec-
tive experience is unexpressed and therefore inexpressible in positivist or 
academic history. Dilthey and Carr argue that positivist or academic his-
tory, by ignoring this historical subjective experience, have failed to under-
stand the role history plays in our lives, and further have misunderstood 
human nature. So, they propose, since positivist science and academic his-
torians have ignored this fact, that there is a priority to this subjective 
understanding of history. Dilthey even goes so far as to propose that the 
subjective and the objective understanding of history are different in kind, 
and argues for the superiority of the former.
I will show that if these theorists are correct that an historical narrative 
mediates our sense of the world and ourselves, this provides positivist or 
academic history with an essential role as critic of this pre-reflective narra-
tive. Carr and Dilthey in particular offer great insight into the historical 
nature of human experience, but they misunderstand the valuable role to 
be played by positivist, ‘objective’, or academic history. I will argue that 
what they show is that objective history can be a valuable tool for critiquing 
and improving our pre-reflective historical consciousness. Finally, I pro-
pose that we can accept the essentially historical nature of human subjec-
tivity, while still finding an important role for academic, or ‘objective’ 
history. 
Phenomenology and History
The phenomenological method does not seem to be, at first glance, a par-
ticularly useful tool for understanding history or individuals as historical 
subjects. Phenomenology, particularly the phenomenology of the early 
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Husserl, appears to bracket, or put aside, historical concerns as it puts aside 
all particularistic aspects of phenomena in order to identify their essences. 
Husserl’s method identifies essences – the timeless ideas and essences that 
transcend lived experience. History, as lived experience, appears to be 
exactly the sort of concern and subject matter that a phenomenologist 
would purposively ignore.
In “Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man”, Merleau-Ponty identifies 
a major shift in Husserl’s thinking about the relation between essence and 
existence. Whereas in his early work, Husserl aims to found phenomenol-
ogy as a science of essences, he later recognizes the relation between exis-
tence or experience of the world and essences as interconnected and 
reciprocal. Merleau-Ponty sees this change in Husserl as analogous to a 
change in the human sciences that he thinks brings phenomenology and 
scientific practice closer together. Merleau-Ponty writes, “As his thinking 
developed, Husserl was led to link more and more what he had at first 
sharply separated – the possible and the actual, essence and existence. This 
movement corresponds to evolution of the human sciences, in so far as 
they are tending to free themselves from their scientistic and positivistic 
postulates which perhaps favored their beginnings but which now require 
their further development.”2 The ‘positivistic postulates’ to which Merleau-
Ponty refers are the methodological views that the proper objects of  science 
are those things that are independently observable. Subjective experience, 
as necessarily private, is excluded from such inquiries, and thus placed out-
side the scope of science. Just as the phenomenology focused on essences 
seemed to exclude lived experience from its study of essences, so positivist 
science excluded subjectivity from its own inquiry – essentially, leaving 
human experience outside the realm of the comprehensible. 
Merleau-Ponty proposes that Husserl moved from a position where 
essences were primary (though ontologically agnostic), to one where expe-
rience and essence were interrelated and only properly understood from a 
phenomenological point of view where the object of science was not objec-
tified, but understood as experienced.
The lesson that Merleau-Ponty takes from Husserl’s turn from essence to 
existence is that we are situated in the world, and that the foundations of 
2) Maurice Merleau-Ponty, James M. Edie (trans.) “Phenomenology and the Human Sci-
ences” in The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays. (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1964), 84–85.
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our knowledge are particular, contingent, and influenced by where and 
when we are situated. This contingency should not lead us to deny the 
validity of our knowledge. Rather, contingent lived experience shapes our 
being and the objects of the world. If we don’t include lived experience and 
subjective understanding of the world and our experiences among the ‘fur-
niture of the world’, then we will fail to understand the ‘world’. 
We must understand how our lived situation impacts our thought. The 
project for Husserl, after The Crisis of the Human Sciences, is to find a method 
that does not rely solely on facts with no universal meaning, or on essences, 
unconnected to the world of life. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “It is a question 
of finding a method which will enable us to think at the same time of the 
externality which is the principle of the sciences of man, and of the inter-
nality which is the condition of philosophy, of the contingencies without 
which there is no situation, as well as of the rational certainty without 
which there is no knowledge.”3 Thus, the method that we need is one that 
understands the interconnectedness of experience and meaning, of situ-
ated existence and transcendent truths through the subjective experience 
of the embodied subject in its situation. 
Merleau-Ponty proposes existential phenomenology as just such a 
method. Existential phenomenology is a method that focuses not on the 
priority of essence or of existence, but one that understands that the two 
are in a sense equiprimoridial in the experience of a living subject. In this 
way, Merleau-Ponty and the later Husserl return phenomenology to its 
Hegelian roots – we cannot understand the object, history, or the world, 
until we understand the role of the subject in its creation. Thus, any science 
ought to be a science of the experience of that living subject. Instead of tak-
ing elements of that experience and objectifying them: behavior, language, 
mind, history, phenomenology should be the study of lived behavior, lived 
language, lived mind, lived history, etc. We must not leave subjective expe-
rience out of our investigations of phenomena, at the risk of misunder-
standing the phenomena. 
Merleau-Ponty’s work investigates how incorporating subjective experi-
ence into psychology changes the study of the human mind and behavior – 
he does not tackle the science of history. What would it mean to incorporate 
subjective experience into the sciences of man, in particular, into the 
3) Ibid., 52.
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 science of history? What does this shift in the phenomenogical method 
mean for understanding history? How will positivist or objective accounts 
of history need to change in order to include lived experience and subjec-
tive understanding of history? 
In Time, Narrative, and History, David Carr takes up this question. Carr 
argues against the view that academic historical inquiry is paradigmatic of 
our relation to history. He proposes that academic historical inquiry is sec-
ondary to our own lived and imagined history, through which we make 
sense of and give meaning to the world around us. It is only because of the 
importance of this subjective historical experience that we come to engage 
in academic or objective narrative histories. Prior to such academic inves-
tigations of the past, Carr argues we have a closer pre-thematic understand-
ing of the past that functions in all of our perceptions of the world. Carr 
proposes that history – lived, imagined and subjectively experienced – 
functions as a horizon for all of our actions. ‘Horizon’ is a technical term in 
phenomenology, meaning ‘reality’ as conceived by the individual or collec-
tive. History serves as a horizon for our actions in the following way: we 
come to understand the world around us as historical, as shaped by histori-
cal forces. Thus, the objects in our world and the actions of those around us 
are seen as having meaning within a conception of history. The historical 
‘horizon’ is just this background conception of history against which actions 
and objects are understood. 
Carr bases his phenomenological understanding of history on Husserl’s 
schematization of the structure of time. For Husserl, Carr argues, time was 
not empty, but was lived. Lived time is time that is full of events, full of 
action. Time is lived through events. Time connects our experience in the 
present to that of a past whose meaning is very real to us. Carr takes up 
Husserl’s ideas about the fullness and structure of temporal experience to 
show that our perception is structured temporally. Using Husserl and Carr’s 
example of the melody can clarify this temporal structure. When one hears 
a melody, one must hear it in time, one note after another. Even though 
one hears the notes as discrete, one organizes them into one object, ‘the 
melody’. This is possible, Husserl argues, because of the temporal structure 
of our perceptions. When we hear a note, we retain that note in our mem-
ory for a period of time, in what Husserl calls retention. This retention, 
along with present perception, is retained on the basis of a protention, 
where one waits in expectation for the next note in the melody. This note, 
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once heard, will be added to the forming idea of the temporally extended 
object, the melody. Thus, Carr shows, we could not experience the melody 
if we were not both attuned to the past and to the future. Since all of our 
experience is in time, and thus all of the objects of our perception are tem-
porally extended, in order to perceive, let alone understand, anything we 
must have both retention and protention, memory of the recent past and 
expectation of the near future. 
On both a pre-reflective and reflective level, subjects use history and 
understanding of the past in order to act and in order to project themselves 
into the future. That is, our background understanding of history shapes 
the meaning of our actions. Carr writes, “The horizons of future and past 
are not empty forms. We can no more conceive of an experience of empty 
future than one empty of past – speaking here, not of the recollected past 
or the expected future, but of those of retention and protention. As these 
notions are understood by Husserl, without past and future there can be no 
present and thus no experience at all.”4
Our expectations of the future, our protentions, are based on past experi-
ence. We only know what to expect from what we have experienced in the 
past. Thus we are always expecting a future, and this expectation is based 
on our understanding of our experience in the past. This does not mean 
that the future cannot surprise us, but it does mean that we will have to take 
a moment to reflect on how this new surprise coheres with our knowledge 
of the world so far. Just as we act with a view toward the past, we project 
ourselves forward into the future. Carr cites Heidegger as an example 
of a phenomenologist who sees humans as projected toward the future. 
 Heidegger writes, “Human existence is characterized by its . . .  projective 
character.”5 This projective character means that action is focused toward 
the future, toward the goal of action. However, Carr writes, “This emphasis 
on the future-orientation of action, and on the role of the end in organizing 
‘backward’ in time the various phases of action which are the means to its 
realization, must not obscure the fact that the agent is still rooted in the 
present . . . Any retrospective element in action can only be a quasi 
retrospection.”6 We may look forward towards our goals and backwards 
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do not live in the future, or in the past. We are only ever in the present, 
which our understanding (horizons) of past and future make visible. Carr 
writes, “the present ‘stands out’ from the past and future horizons which 
make it what it is: present.”7
According to Merleau-Ponty, our past experience serves not only as a 
horizon but also as a guide and orienting principle.8 Our experiences in the 
past teach us what to expect of the world, how to understand and recognize 
phenomena. Further, we are habitual creatures. Once we learn a behavior 
we incorporate it into our life as a habit, and do not necessarily consciously 
reflect on it. Thus, many of our current actions are simply carried over from 
previous experiences and habits. We carry our past experience along with 
us in our present behavior in the form of habits we have learned. For 
 Merleau-Ponty our current action is the result of our pre-reflective and 
reflective synthesis of what we have learned from the past. We need to 
understand the past, because it is our horizon for meaningful action. It is 
the basis on which our actions are possible and make sense. Our actions are 
also goal oriented and directed toward a future. Thus, the past and the 
future are horizons for my present experience. I look backward toward the 
past and forward toward the future to act in the present. 
However important this pre-reflective experience is, Carr also allows 
that we have a reflective understanding of the past that is necessary for self-
identity and for understanding our situation and world. In reflecting on the 
meaning of our lives or our past, we engage in such reflective synthesis. We 
do not merely live through events as temporally extended objects; we our-
selves are temporally extended objects. The individual develops in time; it 
has its own past, which it understands as both connected and distant from 
the present. Thus, Carr explains, our identity depends on being able to syn-
thesize our past with our present in order to carry ourselves forward to 
project ourselves into the future. Following up on Husserl’s insight that, 
“the ego constitutes itself, for itself, in the unity of a history,” 9 Carr writes 
that we should understand the unity of self, “not as an underlying identity, 
but as a life that hangs together, not a pre-given condition but an achieve-
ment.” In the process of reflecting on our past and incorporating new 
  7) Ibid., 40.
  8) Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology of Perception. Colin Smith (trans.). (New York: 
Routledge, 2002), Chapters 1 and 2. 
9) Carr, Time, Narrative, and History, 73.
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 experiences and bringing along old experiences into a unified self, Carr 
writes, “what we are doing is telling and retelling, to ourselves and others, 
the story of what we are about and what we are.”10 We achieve a synthesis, 
a unified self, by reflecting on our present and past experiences, and syn-
thesizing them with a view toward the future. 
For Carr, this synthesis of our identity does not happen in a vacuum. 
Space is filled not only with events but also with other people. We are in a 
historical, social world. Society and culture can affect even passive percep-
tion through the learning process. Carr writes, “Traditions, styles of life, 
 ideals and values are not just handed over to us by others but are first of all 
handed down by our elders when we are young.”11 The social world does 
not merely influence but in fact constitutes my consciousness of the world. 
Carr writes, “the individual’s engagement in the ongoing tradition of a 
socially constituted endeavor is essential to what individual consciousness 
is about; and its relation to that tradition affects everything it does; cer-
tainly its active pursuit if truth, but also, at least possibly, even its most 
passive perception of the world.”12 My involvement in a social world, which 
extends temporally before my birth to after my death, shapes how I under-
stand the world, and extends my understanding of and identifications with 
history. Family and early childhood life situations are important, because it 
is in these contexts that we learn the world. We learn history and we learn 
the present, we learn how to do things and how to talk about things. We 
learn how to organize our experiences, how to move our bodies, and how 
to think. Much of this we can do on our own, but there is an important situ-
ational aspect, which includes what we need to know about the world, the 
past, and our situation in order to survive and flourish. 
For Carr, each individual embodies a historical moment while carrying it 
forward and constructing its future. Carr explains:
For the individual, his or her own narrative, whether of work, or other particu-
lar projects, or of life, exists within a larger temporal context which is itself 
narrative in character and which involves other people in a predecessor- 
successor relation. The importance of configuration for narrative obtains here 
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whole to which it belongs, so any particular story depends for its sense on the 
larger narrative context of which it is a part.13 
The historical subject achieves a sense of identity and learns the world from 
their communities and societies. 
Academic history – the objective investigation into what ‘actually’ hap-
pened – arises out of our investigations of this primary subjective historical 
sense. Academic history, he argues, is a rather different pursuit than our 
everyday understanding of history. Carr understands academic history as 
arising out of individual reflective history, where the individual consciously 
examines his or her past in order to create a synthesis in the form of a nar-
rative which links up to former narrative understandings of themselves in 
the past, and to larger narratives like the history of their community or 
world. It is secondary, he proposes, to this initial subjective historical 
understanding. History, for Carr, is secondary to historicity.
Historicity vs. History: Mink’s Objection to Historical Phenomenology
Louis O. Mink argues that the phenomenological concept of historicity, by 
making historical understanding the model for all understanding, robs the 
discipline of history of its special subject matter and method. His project is 
to identify what is unique and important about historical understanding, 
and he sees the concept of historicity as ignoring the fact that there is some-
thing special about historical comprehension, which must be the case if 
history is to be a separate discipline. Mink writes, “Although the theme of 
the so-called historicity of man’s being in the world has increasingly come 
into focus in the thought of succeeding phenomenologists such as Heide-
gger, what it reveals is that positing historicity as the ground of all experi-
ence and understanding does not give the differentiae of specifically human 
understanding . . . which alone can justify history as a discipline.”14 It may 
be that historical comprehension, the relating of particulars to particulars, 
is the model of all understanding, but regardless of whether or not this is 
true, the concept of historicity, that we are in a historical situation and that 
our actions are linked with the past and create the future, points out not 
13) Ibid., 115.
14) Ibid., 112.
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the uniqueness of history, but it does lead us to the other feature which 
Mink wants to prove, the importance of historical understanding. Mink 
writes that making history a part of the everyday way we reason strips it of 
its uniqueness, but I would argue that it shows its importance.
If Carr is right, and our historicity – our background understanding of 
ourselves – shapes our conception of ourselves and our actions, then aca-
demic history is essential, rather than a mere addition to the human sci-
ences. If our background conception of ourselves and the history of our 
community is wrong, then this can affect our actions and our sense of our-
selves is profound and terrifying ways. Academic history, understanding 
ourselves in the context of what has happened and how attitudes and sub-
jective experiences of others have shaped this experience is essential in 
order to understand and explain the world and ourselves. Historical under-
standing, thus, becomes a precondition to all of the human sciences. It is 
not, as Mink worried, stripped of its importance, but finally recognized as 
essential to our wellbeing. 
This insight, that historical understanding shapes our subjectivity and 
creates the future on the basis of this subjective understanding of history is 
an axiom of Dilthey’s hermeneutic philosophy of history. Dilthey also 
understands the individual as historical, as a locus or center of a meaning-
ful historical nexus, and as interpreter and creator of history. Dilthey distin-
guishes natural and human sciences (like history) on the basis of the 
importance of the subject and of subjective concerns for these inquiries. 
Dilthey writes:
The difference between the human and natural sciences is not just about the 
stance of the subject toward the object; it is not merely about a kind of atti-
tude, a method. Rather, the procedure of understanding is grounded in the 
realization that the external reality that constitutes its objects is totally differ-
ent from the objects of the natural sciences. Spirit has objectified itself in the 
former, purposes have been embodied in them, values have been actualized in 
them, and understanding grasps this spiritual content that has been formed in 
them. A life relationship exists between me and them. Their purposiveness is 
grounded in my capacity to set purposes, their beauty and goodness in my 
capacity to establish value, their intelligibility in my intellect. Furthermore, 
these realities are not reducible to my lived experience and understanding: 
they form the nexus of a representational world in which the externally given 
is connected with the course of my life. I live in this representational world, 
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and its objective validity is guaranteed to me through a constant interchange 
with the lived experience and understanding of others. The concepts, the uni-
versal judgments, the general theories [of the human sciences] are not hypoth-
eses about something to which we relate external impressions but derive from 
lived experience and understanding.15
For Dilthey, because the historical-social world is made by humans, and 
made by the purposive, evaluative, intelligent beings, it must be under-
stood in terms of these ‘subjective’ elements: purposes, values, ideas, which 
he argues are not part of the objective of history. Thus, the subject, the 
creator of purposes, values, and ideas, must be the subject of inquiry, 
as a subject, not as objectified. For Dilthey, the subject is enmeshed in a 
 historical-social world. The individual is historical. Dilthey writes, “a single 
person in his seemingly self-reliant existence is already a historical being. 
He is determined by his position in the time line, his place in space, his role 
in the cooperation of cultural systems and communities.”16 The subject is 
always oriented, or pulled along toward the future through being concerned 
or outwardly directed towards its environment. Dilthey writes, “The indi-
vidual existence of single persons unfolds into an infinite richness of life on 
the basis of their concerned relations to their environment, to other people, 
and to things. But each individual is also a point of intersection of systems 
that penetrate both it [and other] individuals, that exist within them, but 
that also reach beyond their life.”17 Thus, for Dilthey, the subject exists 
within a meaningful nexus shaped by its past and its projection towards its 
future, towards which it is pulled.
Does this mean the objective science of history is really separate from 
this endeavor? Can there really be no role for values in objective history? 
Can understanding and explanation not be two aspects of one critical 
endeavor? Despite his protests against positivist history, Dilthey proposes 
a science of history that, while beginning with the subject, does not end 
there.
15) Wilhelm Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences. Selected 
Works, volume 3. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi, (trans., eds.). (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2002), 141.
16) Ibid., 157.
17) Ibid., 156.
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Dilthey’s project is a critical one – he wants to show the importance of 
lived experience, and the centrality of the human subject. According to 
Dilthey, the historian’s task is to understand the present individual as a 
synthesis and as a locus of outwardly directed interests and meanings. 
Dilthey writes, “The historian must, therefore, understand the whole life of 
an individual as it manifests itself at a specific time and place. It is the over-
all continuum proceeding from individuals – insofar as they aim at the 
development of their own existence – to cultural systems and communities 
and, finally, to humanity at large that constitutes the character of society 
and history. Individuals, as much as communities and systems, are the log-
ical subjects of history.”18 Dilthey’s contemporaries, historians who sought 
to find the meaning in history through the movement of systems rather 
than through the lived experience of individuals, may not have allowed for 
the importance of subjective experience. However, his account does not 
rule out critically examining the past. 
Like Carr, Dilthey sees the subject in the present as at an intersection 
and also as a synthesis of the past and the present, directed toward the 
future. He writes, “This lived experience contains a structural nexus of con-
sciousness: objective apprehension forms the background for an attitude of 
care and sadness about the objectively apprehended state of affairs as well 
as for striving to get beyond it. All this is there for me as a structural nexus. 
I bring the whole situation to distinct consciousness.”19 Our outward-
directedness into the historical world is a relation much like that of phe-
nomenological intentionality. My outward directedness constitutes my 
consciousness. My thoughts and my actions are from somewhere, about 
something, towards something. Dilthey writes, “All this ‘about’, ‘from’, and 
‘towards’ all these relations of lived experience to what is remembered and 
to what lies in the future, pull me along both backwards and forwards.”20 
For Dilthey, the individual is a productive nexus of meaning. The subject 
creates history and meaning through its life experience. The history and 
culture and systems of value that individuals and communities make 





218 E. Tucker / Journal of the Philosophy of History 7 (2013) 205–229
on the meaning of this synthesis is the goal and the project of the human 
sciences.
The individual appropriates his or her past in both a reflective and pre-
reflective way. Carr has shown that in order to have the kind of experience 
we do, we must have a sense of the past and a sense of the future in order to 
be able to act in the present. To hear a melody as temporally extended 
object I must be able to remember the last note and look forward to the 
next one as part of the same object. Carr invokes Husserl’s concepts of pro-
tention and retention, as this simultaneous looking backward and forward 
in experiencing the present. This is the pre-reflective sense in which the 
subject is historical. 
There is also a reflective moment of looking back at ones actions, and 
perhaps at the actions of others in order to determine their meaning. This 
can happen on an individual level, to make sense of one’s life experience, to 
understand it as a unified whole or unified story, or it can happen at the 
level of a community. A community or a member of a community looks 
back on the meaning of the events in the community’s history to get a sense 
of their meaning, where they have brought the community to in the pres-
ent, and how they affect where the community will go in the future. Carr 
takes this community history to be the model for academic history. 
Historians, Carr argues, do not investigate history ex nihilo. As members 
of communities and as historical individuals they have what Carr calls a 
‘pre-thematic understanding of history’ that allows them to begin their 
investigations. Instead of starting from particulars and rules of evidence, 
Merleau-Ponty and Carr suggest that one must start with an idea, or pre-
reflective, pre-thematic understanding or orientation in order to know 
where to begin looking and what to look at. In reflection one reflects upon 
what one has experienced and this reflection is brought forward into the 
future to all future experiences. Thus, reflection on the past helps shape the 
understanding and the conceptualization of all future events. Now, at any 
time one could stop, reflect, and find that the synthesis of the past that one 
had made is inadequate. One’s individual past is the medium through 
which one acts; it is one’s conditions of possibility and conditions ones pos-
sibility. It is reflected upon, and thus experience becomes conceptualized. 
One interprets one’s experience, but only in reflection, in retrospect.
The academic discipline of history, in which each of the members is 
immersed in the study of the past of all cultures and periods, creates a 
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 community of its own. The academic historian has pre-reflective notions of 
history as such from this community and from his or her own experience as 
a historical being and as a member of a socio-historical community. Thus, 
each investigation of the past is influenced by these pre-reflective under-
standings that may be made explicit and revised in the historian’s work. 
For Dilthey, the individual subject is just the beginning point for histori-
cal inquiry. He writes that we must move from insights into particular lives 
to the universal nexus “contained in them”22 In order to arrive at universal 
knowledge we must surpass the subject. “The certainty attributable to per-
sonal life-experience differs from the universal validity of science . . .”23 at 
which any objective history must aim. But how does the historian move 
from understanding the specific meaning of an individual life to a larger 
nexus? These are important questions, and ones that we will be better able 
to address after a short discussion on the reasons that we do history, and 
what a history ought to be. We shall see that problem of moving from indi-
vidual subjective meaning to general or universal meaning is one that is 
shared by both hermeneutics and phenomenology. But first we must add to 
our initial query the further question, why do we study history? 
Why do we study history? Nietzsche suggests, “Every person and every 
people . . . uses a certain knowledge of the past.”24 However, they do not 
need history for purely academic or intellectual reasons, or because knowl-
edge of the past is an end in itself. Instead, he writes, “the understanding of 
the past is desired at all times to serve the future and the present”. Knowl-
edge of the past is useful for those in the present, serving both the present 
and the future. Why should this be? Why should knowledge of the past be 
important for action or understanding of the present, let alone the future? 
Perhaps to answer these questions we should focus on investigating, not 
history but humanity. What is it about human nature that encourages the 
study of history? In order to properly understand historical understanding, 
we need to have an understanding about what kinds of beings we are, what 
kind of understanding we are looking for, and what answers will satisfy us.
22) Ibid., 27.
23) Ibid., 154
24) Friedrich Nietzsche. On the Use and Abuse of History for Life. (1873) Ian C. Johnston 
(trans.). (Nanaimo, British Columbia: Malaspina University-College, September 1998). 
http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/Nietzsche/history.htm
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Phenomenologists suggest that we are in a situation that we are thrown 
into the world. This world is not fully formed on our arrival, but has been 
developed over time. Many civilizations have left their mark before we 
arrive on the scene, and shape the world into which we so arrive. Our every-
day world is historical. The rules of the road developed over time, our 
national diet is a product of agricultural and cultural history. Not only our 
world but also we ourselves are historical. By the time we reflect on history 
proper, we have already lived long enough to accumulate some of our own. 
Our lives and our world are sedimented with layers of meaning from the 
past which we live through, which we presuppose and which gives mean-
ing to our existence. Carr writes, “To say that we are ‘historical beings‘ and 
‘intertwined with history’ is not meaning to say that we are all in history as 
part of the historical process. It means that we are in history as we are in the 
world: it serves as horizon and background for our everyday experience.”25 
We are beings for whom our Being is an issue, as Heidegger suggested. We 
are interested in our lives, in understanding the forces that act upon us and 
the results and consequences of our own actions. From the moment of our 
birth we are reaching outward to grasp this world, to understand it, to 
understand ourselves and our place in it. We are thrown into the world, 
into a situation, into a particular body, and history has worked to shape all 
of these and our ideas about them. Exploration of the past arises from our 
exploration of our world in general. There is much we need to know and to 
understand in order to function and to thrive in the world. Our situation is 
historical, and thus, we must engage in historical investigations. 
We have seen that the individual subject is historical, and this alone 
would provide reason enough for historical inquiry, or for showing the 
importance of including the subject in history. The subject is not merely a 
historical object, but is the center of a historical nexus. The individual lives 
in time, in history, and creates history. The individual, in its present action, 
is a living embodied synthesis of the past, present, and future. The individ-
ual is the center of this nexus of meaning. The subject is historical, and 
brings the past into the present in its grasping toward the future. 
When Mink looks to find the past, he says that it is gone, and echoing 
Gertrude Stein, writes that there is no there there. What can we make of 
this? Is there a realm of the historical that we access through old  documents? 
25) Carr, Time, Narrative, and History, 4.
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Does the historical world persist? Yes and no. The historical world is our 
world. The focus on the subject shows us that the past is present. That we 
either bring it with us into the present and future, or it is lost. Artifacts, 
documents, archives, historical institutions, and memory are all we have of 
the past. The past is here. It is now. There is no other place that it could be. 
We relate to the past in a multitude of ways. Our past, and the past of the 
community to which we belong influence how we see the world and how 
we understand our context and our situation. Thus, to understand our-
selves, we must understand not only our own past, but the past of our com-
munities. Thus, the subject of history, as an individual acting in the present, 
and as member of a community and world, is the center of a historical proj-
ect. The subject is the center in that it in its actions it synthesizes the past 
with a view toward the future, and creates the future on the basis of this 
synthesis. The locus of historical understanding is the individual in the 
present. Carr writes, “I am always ‘located’ in the now with respect to past 
and future experiences.”26 We live in the historical nexus of the past, pres-
ent, and future. Studying history, then, for Carr, becomes an individual 
obligation – part of the project of self-understanding. Can we then, return 
to the methods of positivist or academic history? Do we have an obligation 
to do so?
How We Study History
While Carr and Dilthey offer us new and valuable ways of understanding 
why we study history, the question of how we ought to study history 
remains. Is it enough to explore our pre-reflective understanding of his-
tory? Is this a replacement for positive historical method? 
Carr seems to suggest that historicity is prior to the academic study of 
history, thus supporting Mink’s worry. However, what he shows is only that 
the horizon of subjective history is temporally epistemically prior – that is, 
we experience and ‘know’ this subjective narrative of history before we 
come to investigate the world as academic historians. However, given the 
importance of our sense of history in shaping our individual and collective 
identity, Carr has given us the beginning of an argument for the epistemic 
priority of academic history. 
26) Carr, Time, Narrative, and History, 27.
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If our background sense of the world and its history shapes the way we 
act and interact, and in fact, as Carr argues, shapes our very notions of our-
selves, then the academic study of history gives us the ability to understand 
the world as it is, and ourselves, as we really are – or at least the possibility 
of revising our extant conceptions. 
Let’s consider the stakes of such investigation. Should we live in a coun-
try which we suppose to be benevolent and righteous, and thus understand 
ourselves to be the inheritors of a tradition of benevolence and justice, learn-
ing otherwise would change not only our conception of ourselves, but also 
could threaten to challenge everything we know about the world. Any revi-
sion to our historical consciousness can shake us to our very foundations.
Academic history, insofar as it challenges our pre-reflective historical 
conception of the world and ourselves, has enormous power and impor-
tance. Academic history, which on Carr’s view is always an attempt to 
investigate or revise our pre-reflective historical understanding, is thus 
both essential and extremely dangerous. Given our historical conscious-
ness, any divergence from our background understanding of the narratives 
of who we are and what the world and our community mean, threatens to 
undermine individual self-understandings, social trust and community 
identity. Yet, despite these dangers, the aim of phenomenology and herme-
neutics is still to understand the world and us. If our background concep-
tions are false, we must revise them. 
The phenomenological investigation into our historicity – our subjective 
historical sense – is still important. It shows us where we start, and how our 
historical conceptions of the world and ourselves shape our actions, per-
ceptions, and collective identity. However, the revision of that subjective 
horizon, academic history, gains immensely in importance. We could all be 
wrong about who we are, and how we came to be this way. Our concep-
tions of ourselves and the past might not be correct. If our self-conceptions 
and collective identity rest on fictions, then academic history has enor-
mous power to unsettle these identities.
From Situation to Science, Historicity to History
The phenomenologists and hermeneuticists we have looked at find the 
source of the historical synthesis in the individual. Both seek to find mean-
ing in the subjective experience or the subjective qualities of human 
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 experience, which is supposed to center and guide our aim of universal or 
general understanding of the world in general and the historical world in 
particular. But how should we move from individual understanding to 
understanding as such? This is a problem both for hermeneutics and phe-
nomenology, and while their solutions to this problem are importantly 
linked, they are different enough to merit discussion.
For Dilthey, the end of historical knowledge is the ability to characterize 
the spirit of ages and epochs past. From this identification, we can better 
judge individual past actions. For Dilthey, the relation of a past individual 
to the spirit of his or her age is of a part to the whole. The whole is the gen-
eralized meaning of the age, and the part is the individual who is acting of 
and through this spirit. The individual realizes the spirit of his or her age to 
a greater or lesser extent and can be judged and more fully understood on 
this basis. Dilthey writes of the individual life, “In this life-course, each par-
ticular lived experience is related to a whole. This life-nexus is not the sum 
or totality of successive moments but a unity constituted by relations that 
link all its parts.”27 Thus, the meaningful nexus that the individual creates 
with his or her life is connected to a larger nexus. Understanding both the 
particular and the larger general or universal nexus is the project of history. 
Dilthey writes, “It is the task of historical analysis to find in the concrete 
purposes, values, and ways of thinking of an epoch a concordance about 
something common that governs it. This common background determines 
even the contrasts. Thus, each action, each common creation, in short, 
each part of this historical whole, has its significance through its relation-
ship with the whole of the epoch or age.”28 Each individual will be judged 
by this benchmark.
The method that he suggests to use for determining the spirit of an age is 
induction. He writes, “Lived experiences present us with the reality of life 
in its manifold references, but the experiencing as such seems to only give 
us knowledge of something singular, namely, our own life. It remains 
knowledge of something unique, and no logical aid can overcome this lim-
itation of the individual lived experience, which is rooted in the way it is 
experienced. Understanding first overcomes this limitation of the individ-
ual lived experience and, at the same time, bestows the character of life-
experience to personal lived-experiences. Extending to various people, 
27) Dilthey, The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences, 162.
28) Ibid., 177.
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creations of human spirit, and communities, it widens the horizon of the 
individual life and, in the human sciences, opens up the path that leads 
from the common to the universal.”29 Understanding the particular life 
requires knowledge of the general,30 however, understanding of particular 
life cannot quite achieve universal knowledge. The circle emerges: in order 
to understand individual lives, we must identify a spirit of their age; how-
ever, we must follow an inductive method, looking to individuals to find 
out what spirit they are exemplifying. This circle cannot be breached unless 
another element is added. One must pick the right examples. 
Husserl and Merleau-Ponty’s insight is of help on this point. For 
 Merleau-Ponty, no induction is ever pure. Merleau-Ponty writes, “induc-
tion will remain blind if we do not know it in some other way, and indeed 
from the inside of consciousness itself, what this induction is dealing with.”31 
No scientist of note ever collects examples and merely from this collection 
comes to an idea of their unity. Rather, Merleau-Ponty suggests, one begins 
with an idea of what one is looking for, and from this idea, one begins col-
lecting examples, and from these examples clarify this basic idea. Induc-
tion, if it is to be successful, according to Merleau-Ponty, cannot be a blind 
assemblage. Rather, the process that great scientists use is more a process 
of clarification or reflection. This “reflection is not at all the noting of a fact. 
It is, rather, an attempt to understand.”32 The scientist does not wait for the 
random examples of phenomena to lay themselves out in order, or to speak 
the connection between them; the scientist does not find connections, “He 
forms it actively; he constructs it. Then, having constructed this idea, 
he verifies it by showing how the confused empirical facts . . . can then 
be understood through the introduction of additional conditions which 
explain the difference between the facts and the pure concept.”33 Instead of 
induction, Merleau-Ponty calls this a “reading of the essence”. We can sug-
gest that Dilthey’s method of circular induction is just such a clarifying pro-
cess. General ideas are employed in understanding specific cases, which 
are then interpreted and clarified, and seen as exemplifying the general 
idea or spirit or not. 
29) Ibid., 162.
30)  Ibid., 164.
31)  Merleau-Ponty, The Primacy of Perception, 58.
32)  Ibid., 64.
33)  Ibid., 69.
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How does this compare to the phenomenologist’s search for universal 
meaning? From the early phenomenology to the later interpretation by 
Merleau-Ponty, we can educe two separate solutions to the problem of 
gaining universal knowledge from particulars. The problems of objectifica-
tion and external determinism are related for both Merleau-Ponty and 
Husserl, and the existential phenomenological answer to the problem of 
universal knowledge from particulars is related to these concerns. When 
you take humans to be objects, it becomes easy to see them as determined 
products of external forces which create them, determine their actions 
from without (external determinism – history, society, culture) and within 
(still, an external determinism, psychologism). However, when you under-
stand humans as conscious, active creators and discoverers of meaning in 
the world, it is no longer possible to take them as externally determined. 
Thus, by misunderstanding consciousness, leaving out subjective experi-
ence, and taking humans to be objects, science misunderstands the actual 
existence of humans and the possibilities of the world. Looking at history 
from the viewpoint of philosophy, for the later Husserl means rediscover-
ing the relation of philosophy to life, of ideas to existence, of thought to the 
world. The move to universal validity then becomes a search for intersub-
jective meaning. This whole, this transcendent meaning is reinterpreted by 
Merleau-Ponty34 to mean intersubjective meaning. For these phenomenol-
ogists, we must recognize and think through our contingent experience and 
situatedness, and move beyond it to reach universal, intersubjective mean-
ing. Thus, we are required to aim at thinking the whole. This means think-
ing the whole of history and the present; thinking the whole of the world, 
and our experience of it. What even existentialist phenomenology does not 
relinquish is the task of thinking beyond one’s particular experience. 
Science and history must understand the place of their inquiry. This self-
consciousness means that we, as subjects and creators of history, must 
become aware of our particular moment in history and our particular 
conditioning – we need to recognize our contingent foundations, but 
we must not rest with this knowledge. We must take a further step to 
try to understand beyond our limited positionality. We are required, as 
 philosophers, to think the whole, and to attempt to transcend our particu-
lar knowledge. This transcendence is concrete and practical, however. It is 
34) Ibid.
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not a mere leap to the infinite from the finite, but it is reformulated in Mer-
leau-Ponty (and he says in the later Husserl) as intersubjectivity.35 In other 
words, we can only transcend our particularity by thinking the whole in 
terms of understanding the particularity of others and trying to come to a 
truth that is intersubjective. If the aims of philosophy are to discover the 
essential, the structural, the timeless, how does situating it and understand-
ing is as lived philosophy change its meaning and its aims? For Husserl, 
showing that philosophy was rooted does not entail showing that it is with-
out truth. These historical/sociological/existent conditions are both condi-
tions of possibility and limits. But it is their meaning (what the conditions 
mean) and not just their existence (that there are conditions) that deter-
mines their effect on the validity of what we say or theorize.
Once we understand that we are historical, in that we are the product of 
history, and the creators of history, what then is our responsibility to the 
past and to the future? How does our practice of history change? 
Walter Benjamin writes that we have what he calls a ‘weak messianic 
power’ with respect to the past.36 We cannot bring the dead to life, but we 
can keep their memory alive. In the wake of writings and rewritings of his-
tory, we have the responsibility, to make sure that the dead survive, to make 
sure their proper meaning is not lost to time and to misinterpretation. This 
idea echoes the roots of the hermeneutical tradition. Hermeneutics is the 
sacred art of salvaging from the past that which is no longer understood 
and clarifying it, in order that the meaning of the past may live again in the 
future. History is written by the victorious, Benjamin writes. Even with only 
the power to write, we must do our part to save those who can no longer 
defend themselves. Dilthey, with his emphasis on universal history sees us 
as both redeemers of the past and makers of the future. We redeem the past 
in that we try to understand how even the smallest detail was important 
and meaningful with respect to the whole. For Dilthey, we are creative 
beings who make the future, but this making is importantly influenced by 
how we understand our past and how we see the relation between the past, 
present and future. In this paper, I have shown that our obligation to under-
35) Ibid.
36) Walter Benjamin, On the Concept of History, in Selected Writings, vol. 4, ed. Howard 
Eiland and Michael W. Jennings, trans. Edmund Jephcott et al., (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2003).
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stand history extends not just to our ancestors, but to ourselves. If, as 
Dilthey and Carr argue, we shape our conceptions of ourselves against a 
historical horizon, then investigating history can reveal truths not just 
about the past, but about us. 
Phenomenologists, especially existentialist phenomenologists, also see 
our relation to the past as one of responsibility. We must take up the past, 
but we have a choice. We can either take it up unreflectively, or we can take 
it up reflectively and choose to continue it or to disavow it. Through the 
process of reflective engagement, and interpretation of the past, we orient 
ourselves toward a future, which is educated by this interpretation. 
Although Carr and Dilthey disavow the project of positive or academic 
history, this is just what the tools of objective history are for – to test and 
critique our pre-reflective understandings of the past. Taking up these tra-
ditions, our responsibility seems to be to understand the past, in that it has 
brought us the present and will affect our future, and to understand that we 
create not only the future, but in a large part the past in our decision to take 
up or leave behind what we know of it. This is the ethical import of positive, 
or rather, critical history. We must understand the way we are shaped by 
our understanding of history, but we must also investigate our understand-
ing of that history, given its power. 
Subjects, as individuals, inhabitants of the world, and members of groups 
carry the past along into the future. Time is not empty. We fill space with 
our actions, and pull along our past with us in the present. Our actions syn-
thesize our past and present and bring into being the future. This offers a 
preliminary answer to the question, why do we need history? We reflect on 
the past anyway; and at a certain point in time we understood that our own 
past was tied to the past that we learned as children, that our language is 
sedimented with meaning from the past and to understand our world, the 
world through which we live, we need to understand how those meanings 
came to be, and further, how they work through us. The subject lives in the 
present, but with a view toward the past and future. We are historical 
beings. We make history, and in living toward the future we bring our past 
with us. In taking our history along with us, we incur a certain responsibil-
ity toward the past. We must understand ourselves as connected with it, 
and from this recognition, begin the sometimes-discomfiting task of under-
standing the past critically.
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In focusing their inquiries on the human subject as center and synthe-
sizer, as interpreter and maker of history, phenomenology and hermeneu-
tics are united; the gains made by each together yield a promising philosophy 
of history. The concept of historicity yielded by later phenomenology and 
Diltheyan hermeneutics proposes that a subjective understanding of his-
tory, while primary, is insufficient for knowledge of the world and ourselves. 
Instead of supporting a merely subjective understanding of history, this 
phenomenological-hermeneutic concept of history rather elevates the aca-
demic study of history as a precondition to all the human sciences, and 
simultaneously as a precondition to understanding ourselves. The horizon 
of historical understanding against which we understand the world and 
ourselves must be questioned, critiqued, investigated. 
Subjective and Objective History: The Phenomenological-hermeneutic 
Method and a Critical Science of History
The project of making experience visible precludes analysis of the workings of 
this system and of its historicity; instead it reproduces its terms.37
Phenomenology and hermeneutic approaches to historicity, to making 
experience visible, do not necessarily challenge the veridicality of that 
experience. However, making experience visible, the first task of a phe-
nomenological-hermeneutic historical practice is a necessary precondition 
to reflecting critically on the horizon of historical experience and meaning 
through which we understand the world and ourselves. Critical reflection, 
in the form of academic history, is an essential move in this epistemic game 
of increasing our knowledge of the world and ourselves. 
Rather than an essential divide, we can forge a productive connection 
between subjective experience and the reflective positive investigation. 
We may begin by reflecting on our subjective experience, but if we do not 
move past our subjective reflection to some conception of the world and 
ourselves that brings us beyond our pre-reflective consciousness, then 
hermeneutics cannot call itself a science of any kind. Rather, what Carr’s 
37) Joan Scott. “Experience” in Judith Butler and Joan Scott (Eds.) Feminists Theorize the 
Political (New York: Routledge, 1992) 25.
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and Dilthey’s investigations into the nature of historical experience and its 
constitutive role in our self-conceptions and social interactions show us is 
that our historicity requires reflection, and indeed requires the kind of pos-
itive or academic history which Carr and Dilthey in a sense seem to want to 
displace. It is because our subjectivity is essentially historical that in order 
to understand this subjectivity we must move beyond our pre-reflective 
consciousness. 
The phenomenological move towards the importance of lived historical 
experience, somewhat surprisingly leads us back to the need for academic 
history. By showing the importance of historicity, and the force of historical 
consciousness on our actions, Carr, Merleau-Ponty, and Dilthey expose 
the epistemic and perhaps even ethical requirement to engage in a rigor-
ous critical history, one which recognizes the importance of historical 
 consciousness.

